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ABSTRACT  
The paper describes the introduction of an emphasis on ‘personal security’ in human security 
thinking and practice, as part of the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to compartmentalize the 
pursuit of security. It reviews the past twenty years of attention to ‘personal security’: both in 
compartments that consider organized physical violence or threats to personal safety and 
property (‘citizen security’), and as parts of more wide-ranging examination of threats to 
fulfilment of basic needs and rights, for example in comprehensive mapping exercises 
undertaken in various UNDP Regional and National Human Development Reports or in 
studies of women’s security. The paper reflects on the complex process of opening-up 
conventional security thinking and practice, seeking value-added and depth without shrinking 
into preconceived compartments.  
Keywords: human security, personal security, citizen security, gender violence, Human 
Development Reports  
 
1. The evolution of a boundary concept: the limits of compartmentalization 
 
Human security analysis looks at threats to fulfilment of basic values in people’s lives. It 
seeks to reorient use of the prioritizing concept ‘security’, towards securing basic needs of 
ordinary people. So it answers the question ‘whose security?’ with: ‘each of us and all of us’. 
In addressing next the question ‘security of what?’, some forms of human security analysis 
have adopted compartmentalization, trying to separately discuss ‘personal security’, 
‘economic security’, ‘environmental security’ and so on. This can be helpful, and fits 
established bureaucratic and disciplinary convenience. It is also often unhelpful. Many 
important threats arise out of the interconnections between different aspects and forces in 
particular situations, so that much of the value-added from human security analysis comes 
not from putting a new name on topics already considered under existing bureaucratic and 
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disciplinary arrangements but from functioning as a boundary concept to transcend those 
divisions, flexibly according to the nature of particular situations. A focus on how people live 
and can live, and the function of looking at priority values and priority threats, require a 
transdisciplinary holistic perspective, at least periodically, in order to see linkages and to 
draw comparisons across ‘sectors’ to try to ensure priority attention to the threats most 
relevant in the given time and place. 
We examine these themes with special reference to ‘personal security’, a 
prominent—and some argue pre-eminently important—area in human security policy and 
research, that stands in contrast to the predominant fields of policy attention in the 20th 
century: national state security and economic growth. We touch on three major 
(overlapping) sub-areas of work:- violence against civilians, during wars, civil wars and other 
armed conflict; crime against civilians; and violence against women, during peace as well as 
war, considered as part of broader examination of threats and forms of marginalization 
affecting women.  
Section 2 explains the emergence of the category ‘personal security’ inside the initial 
formulation of ‘human security’. Section 3 looks at violence-centred work on human security, 
especially the work led from Canada. Section 4 looks at some of the work on gender, 
violence and personal security. Section 5 examines work on selected issues of personal 
security under the new label of ‘citizen security’ which includes a primary focus on issues of 
crime. Section 6 places the work on personal security in perspective by review of the foci of 
around twenty Human Development Reports (HDRs) which have explicitly used a human 
security framework, and sees that only a minority adopted either a violence-focus or crime-
focus. It compares that subset with HDRs which essayed a more comprehensive mapping of 
human security issues in a country or region. Section 7 discusses the roles of each type of 
study and some implications from the swathe of experience that the paper has reviewed 
regarding the potential of human security analyses for opening-up security thinking and 
doing. 
The human security perspective was launched in 1994 by that year’s global Human 
Development Report (UNDP 1994). To judge the progress made since then is a complex 
task. Both the progress and the relevant information are scattered across two hundred 
countries and innumerable organizations; and the concepts and criteria of judgement 
require careful thought. As usual, the glass seems both part full and part empty. The record 
is mixed but includes major advances and gradual subterranean root-formation and spread. 
Comparison with the impact of human security thinking’s sibling, human rights thinking, in 
the first twenty years after the 1948 Universal Declaration (Moyn 2010), confirms that we 
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need to look in many different ‘glasses’, within each of which change processes of a long-
term nature are ongoing. In some human security ‘glasses’ there has, by historical 
standards, been a surprising degree of movement and impact. Judged in terms of need, 
many of the changes appear limited and slow; judged by historic precedents, some seem 
relatively fast.  
That so much activity, over two decades, would be triggered by a short (19 pages, 
apart from its annexes of country examples) and rather quickly drafted chapter in the 1994 
Human Development Report – Ch.2: ‘New Dimensions of Human Security’ – is striking. The 
Report, led by Mahbub ul Haq, aimed for a short-run impact: setting the agenda for the 
Copenhagen Summit on Social Development of 1995. Its Overview was entitled ‘An Agenda 
for the Social Summit’. The report hoped to contribute to grasping a post-Cold War ‘peace 
dividend’ (discussed in its chapter 3), and to promote a new architecture for international 
development cooperation (chapter 4). It had some influence on the 1995 Summit, but that 
did not adopt an explicit language of ‘human security’, and probably not much of a peace 
dividend was reaped. Much though of what chapter 4 proposed for re-focusing development 
cooperation did gradually emerge during the next decade, seen for example in the 
Millennium Declaration of 2000 and the Millennium Development Goals framework.  
Chapter 2, the chapter on human security ideas, has had a wider influence that has 
snowballed during the following two decades, albeit subject to diverse periodic blockages. 
The influence covers a variety of countries and fora—governmental (e.g., in Japan, Latvia, 
Costa Rica, Switzerland, Thailand)i, inter-governmental (e.g., in European Union foreign 
policy) and global (including the UN apex, UNESCO, and the HDR Office); as well as 
research and policy discussions in fields such as environmental change, migration, conflict, 
social protection and humanitarian assistance. This broad-based spread lay behind the 
General Assembly’s endorsement in 2012 of an agreed understanding of human security.   
For judging progress, we need to observe practice over sustained periods, and not 
only in one or two milieux. Related to this, we should avoid essentializing complex, plural 
and evolving discourses. A symptom of such reductionism is the use by some authors of the 
phrase ‘human security’ when they mean ‘human security approaches’/’human security 
thinking’/’human security practices’, or in fact just one particular variant. ‘Human security’ 
becomes converted into a quasi-agent and variegated realities become reduced to an 
oversimplified representation. For Hudson et al., ‘Human security has emerged as a 
theoretical perspective and an operational framework for solving foreign policy problems in 
the post-Cold War era’ (2013, p. 24); whereas, as outlined by Haq (1999) or his collaborator 
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Sen (2013), human security analysis instead, or also, emerged as a way of transcending the 
conventional way of conceiving of ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ policy issues.ii 
Our paper looks at the practice of human security analysis across three discursive 
milieux mentioned earlier: ‘personal security’ in war and post-war, ‘citizen security’ against 
crime, and security for women. In addition we give special attention to the world of Human 
Development Reports, where ‘human security’ analysis was advanced under that label for 
the first time. The HDR milieu allows us to look at varied practice from around the globe.  
 
2. ‘Dimensions of Human Security’ and the notion of ‘personal security’ 
 
The UN Charter of 1945 and the antecedent streams of debate emphasised both the 
plurality and the interconnection of major values and corresponding threats. Human security 
discourse emerged in the 1990s as part of revisiting and rethinking these 1940s post World 
War Two themes, for the post Cold War era. It has frequently used the 1940s language of 
‘freedom from fear’, ‘freedom from want’, and ‘human dignity’ – hence also ‘freedom from 
indignity’ – and stresses how these are interlinked. To help go beyond such broad-brush 
language and support the required context-specific analyses, the 1994 global HDR 
presented the seven dimensions of Human Security – economic-, food-, health-, 
environmental-, personal-, community-, and political- security – that form the focus of this 
collection of papers (UNDP 1994, pp. 24-25). This is in reality primarily a list of sets of 
values, presented as a checklist for reviewing corresponding threats to those values, as the 
report then did (pp. 25-33). Most of the 1994 HDR was devoted to proposed mechanisms 
for making progress in managing the threats. Many of the threats discussed are relevant to 
several of the value-areas, and all the value areas impinge and interact in persons’ lives. 
Except for bureaucratic or academic ease, there is little reason to consider any value area in 
isolation. Indeed, the 1994 HDR did not present the list of seven as the sole or sufficient 
way to think about human security. It warned that the categories link, overlap, and do not 
cover all relevant issues.  
Some of the categories were in early stages of construction, and the report did not 
have the time nor, for its purposes, a need to fine-tune. ‘Personal security’ extended across 
security from physical violence, from other crimes against life and property, and from 
accidents, abuse (including self-abuse, such as via drugs) and neglect; ‘economic security’ 
covered besides employment and income also housing, which could easily have been a 
separate category; the discussion of ‘community security’ covered inter-community conflict, 
indigenous peoples, and more; and ‘political security’ referred to respect for ‘basic human 
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rights’ (p.32), presumably meaning basic civil and political rights. At most, the list served as 
a way of presenting a multitude of relevant issues in a fairly orderly way, using categories 
that might link to existing policy portfolios. Of the seven, most could be fitted largely to 
existing policy discourses and portfolios, such as food, health, environment, and civil and 
political rights. This applied less fully for ‘personal security’, given its sprawling scope and 
the habitual preoccupation of existing security apparatuses with the security of state 
interests, of property, and of themselves. ‘Community security’ too was not sharply 
specified, nor necessarily represented in existing portfolios, which reflects its political 
contentiousness.  
Reflecting the speed of preparation and the brevity of this part of the report, the 
conceptualisation was unrefined. Hence while chapter 2 is entitled ‘New dimensions of 
human security’, it never mentioned ‘dimensions’ again after the title. Presumably the list of 
seven ‘categories’ provided that discussion. But it was all rather provisional, and the report’s 
Overview never discussed either ‘dimensions’ or ‘categories’, nor the list of seven. Instead it 
presented in detail the proposals on a new development cooperation architecture and on 
reaping a peace dividend, in line with its title ‘An agenda for the Social Summit’. The 
Commission on Human Security (2003) too did not adopt the list. 
Using a checklist of standard questions about ‘security’—Whose security? Security as 
perceived by whom? Security of which values? Against which threats? Secured by whom? To 
what extent? By what instruments?—one sees that while the seven 1994 categories are all 
relevant to security of persons, not all have the same status. Food security and 
environmental security are inputs or instruments towards health and other priority values for 
people’s lives; hence the 1994 HDR discussion of environmental security in particular was 
not about a separate set of environmental values but about some distinctive threats. And 
since the seven areas are specified in terms of different questions/criteria, they substantially 
overlap. 
 ‘Personal security’ in particular was an imperfect label. Several if not all the other 
categories are also ‘personal’, including health, access to adequate food, income and work, 
and (under ‘political security’) civil liberties, including for freely chosen and respected 
community membership.iii  
Not explicitly discussed in the 1994 HDR was psychological security, a key aspect of 
‘security of what?’. Yet it is fundamental in lived experience, and central to peace and 
human dignity and as a basis for effective personal agency. It forms part of everyday 
understandings of ‘personal security’. Hence “telling one’s story…is part of the process of 
achieving security” (Wibben 2011:95). Attention here has grown in later work such as by 
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Jennifer Leaning (2013; Leaning et al. 2004), UNESCO regional human security studies (e.g. 
Burgess et al. 2007; UNESCO 2008) and some UNDP human development reports (such as 
for Chile 1998 and Latvia 2003), as well as through increasing attention to ‘subjective’ 
measures (covering both expressed popular perceptions and other measures of subjective 
states). The psychological aspects of ‘personal security’ are crucial elements in a human 
security research and policy agenda, we will argue.  
Human security analysis has often brought an enrichment of security thinking and 
doing that includes ‘deepening’ (attending to the interests of persons and not only states) 
but also ‘widening’ (attending to more threats than violence and more values than physical 
security), empowerment from below (‘secured by whom, with what instruments?’), and 
stronger attention to subjective dimensions of perception and agency (‘security as perceived 
by whom?’; Wibben 2011). Deepening seems to be more readily acknowledged by existing 
security studies and security establishments than these other features. Thus some authors 
have wished to reduce the concept of ‘human security’ to be only what the 1994 HDR 
included under ‘personal security’, or less; arguing that this is the distinctive additional area 
highlighted outside of already existing policy languages and portfolios. Acceptance of such a 
proposal would increase a danger of unbalanced attention to aspects considered in isolation. 
And while personal security as freedom from human-caused physical violence and (other) 
crime has undoubtedly long been a widely accepted concept, even if not under that label, it 
is far from the only longstanding referent of security. Discussion of personal economic 
security became frequent from the mid 19th century onwards (including later partly as ‘social 
security’). The same applies for food security, treated under that label since at least the 
1970s but under other names earlier.  
In the new Routledge Handbook of Human Security (Martin and Owen 2013), which 
has a strong emphasis on the management of violence, the term ‘human security’ occurs 
over 2400 times, but ‘personal security’ only three times; nor has it been replaced by ‘citizen 
security’, which appears not at all. In comparison, other frequencies are: Food security 20x; 
Environmental security 8x; Economic security 6x; Health security 6x; Political security 6x; 
Community security 2x. (Some comparable terms rank as follows: National security 136x; 
State security 33x; Global security 16x; Military security 8x.) So, none of the 1994 list of 
seven labels is much adopted by the Handbook, with the exception of the longer-standing 
‘food security’. This might partly be because of the disciplinary composition of the selected 
authors and topics, but also because other labels are already in use, some of the categories 
(notably the least used terms—‘personal security’ and ‘community security’) have particular 
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problems, and because the encompassing term ‘human security’ matches the unity of a 
person’s life better than does attempted compartmentalisation.   
Correspondingly, we do not see much current use in policy and planning of the 
specific term ‘personal security’ in the way indicated in the 1994 HDR, outside of some 
national HDRs. Instead we see, first, to be discussed in section 3, attempts to reduce to a 
focus on security against physical violence only while yet giving this the encompassing name 
‘human security’, which serves to avoid using that term for a more comprehensive focus and 
for comparisons about what promotes people’s security. In contrast, as discussed in section 
4, work on gender violence that adopts a human security framework does so precisely to 
insist on a comprehensive focus and not a focus on physical violence alone. Next, much 
work goes on under the title ‘personal security services’ or ‘security management’, largely as 
profit-making business, or on security from accidents, under names such as ‘safety’ and ‘risk 
reduction’; these we will not discuss. We look instead in section 5 at a version of the 
‘personal security’ pillar which has emerged and flourished in some public policy discourses 
under the variant name ‘citizen security’.  
 
3. ‘Personal Security’ relabelled as ‘human security’ and reduced to freedom from 
physical violence  
 
The 1994 HDR specified at least three types of threat to personal security: (1) Threats from 
external or internal, regular or irregular (armed) conflict; (2) Threats internal to the polity, 
excluding armed conflict, including diverse kinds of crime, whether committed by the state 
or others; (3) Threats to the self, related to suicide and drug use (p. 30). The second type 
corresponds fairly closely to the agenda of ‘citizen security’. The third type is less discussed 
currently in work using the title ‘human security’, which is unfortunate, given for example 
the scale and failure of the War on Drugs.  
The first type of threat, armed conflict, has been at the forefront in much human 
security discussion. An opening stage brought several impressive examples of successful 
initiatives supported by the Canadian Liberal Party government from 1996 on, launched by 
the foreign minister between 1996 and 2000, Lloyd Axworthy, and executed in partnership 
with a dozen other governments from four continents, grouped from 1998 in the Human 
Security Network. These included: the Ottawa Process (1996-98) leading to the 1999 Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention; the process leading to the 1998 Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court; and the sponsoring of the International Commission on 
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Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), which developed the doctrine of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P; Axworthy 2013) that was adopted at the 2005 World Summit.  
The articulations in 1996-97 still embraced a comprehensive understanding of human 
security. Delimitation of ‘the Canadian version’, with only personal security as the focus of 
human security analysis and policy, came in 1999 after the successes of establishing the 
mine ban and the ICC (Black 2005) and in response to severe budget-cuts. The restriction 
sought manageable short- and medium-term targets while still seeking to brand a distinctive 
Canadian way that bolstered an increasingly precarious national identity (Bosold and 
Werthes 2005; Bosold 2007). Complex views of human insecurities and their relation to well-
being and other possible threats were still spoken about by Axworthy (2001) when out of 
power and continued in the agenda of the Human Security Network. But a ‘freedom-from-
fear’ doctrine, by which was meant fear of physical violence inflicted by persons, took over 
in Canadian foreign policy (Hynek and Bosold 2009). It is reflected in perhaps the most 
prominent and enduring component of the research agenda laid down at that time, the 
Human Security Report series led by Andrew Mack, where human security is reduced to 
personal security which is further reduced to security from organized physical violence, but 
with attention to all its effects including malnutrition and disease. Canada came to advocate 
possible armed interventions, justified in terms of R2P. The other elements of a human 
security agenda were quashed after a Conservative government came to power in 2006.  
The Canadian-led human security approach highlighted what Axworthy called ‘new 
diplomacy.’ In the case of the Ottawa Convention, Gwozdecky and Sinclair (2001) show how 
multiple levels of collaboration between governments, NGOs and different international 
organizations aided reaching an agreement notably quickly, resulting in a Nobel prize for the 
leading coalition of NGOs, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Hynek and Bosold 
(2009) describe the subsequent practice of subordinating NGOs as dependent security 
services contractors. They argue that:  
The narrowing of [or to] the freedom-from-fear doctrine [in Canada] has been a result of 
both the militarization of human security (including the introduction of responsibility to 
protect), where international factors were dominant, and of the transfer of responsibility and 
competency to NGOs in the areas of earlier human security focus, such as landmines 
(domestic factors were decisive here). …[These] are complementary technologies of 
governance in the period of permanent complex emergency. (Hynek and Bosold 2009: 749) 
  Axworthy and associates stressed an inspirational role of human security ideas in 
global governance, facilitating progress through participation of a wider range of actors, as 
permitted by new information and communication technologies. A focus on personal security 
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was intended as a first stage on the way to an expanded conception of human security, not 
as its terminus. In contrast, in the version in the Human Security Reports (HSRs) the focus 
is reduced to political violence. The reports argue that the data do not support prominent 
current narratives about war in our time and show instead major declines. The HSRs extend 
the research led by Kaldor (2007; Kaldor et al. 2007) on the changing patterns of armed 
conflict, and support a direct conversation with the traditional security scholarship which is 
typically skeptical to the human security idea. 
The intention behind the HSR research remains transformational, despite its narrow 
vision of the person that focuses only on bodily integrity. The Reports have confronted the 
tendency of traditional security actors to overemphasize the threat of armed conflict despite 
mounting evidence of a general decline in violence, as argued also by Pinker (2011). The 
2013 Report was dedicated to support Pinker’s argument, while noting the modalities of 
violence that have resisted the general trend, such as low intensity conflicts. The 2012 
Report addressed sexual violence during war, arguing that the current degree of emphasis 
on rape is not supported by the evidence, while the globally pervasive problem of domestic 
violence is usually overlooked. The reports sometimes seem to adhere to the view that there 
can be no good security (Neocleous 2013), that security should not be a desired end goal 
(Buzan 2004), and thus that it is necessary to watch and to limit what is done for security. 
Limiting the scope of ‘human security’ to this narrow vision of the person, all other threats 
to the person may be dealt with, suggests Buzan, by using human rights or other ideas. This 
attempt to appropriate security language for one aspect, and exclude for example economic 
security, runs counter to the opening of security thinking-and-doing to a broader picture of 
the person.  
Work on ‘human security’ as civilian freedom from violence continues as an 
important and well-funded stream. Given the abundance of concepts already available in 
conflict and peace studies, institutionalized well before the emergence of human security 
ideas, the work’s impact has perhaps not been fundamental. The emergence of the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine, first as a proposed offshoot of human security thinking 
and then as a doctrine of its own, has also constrained the welcome given to other human 
security ideas in discussions of conflict, though this might be only temporary. Greater value-
added might arise from broader-focus work—such as illustrated by the work on gender, 
violence and human security which we discuss next—which looks bottom-up at people’s lives 
as a whole, not top-down at artificially isolated aspects.  
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4. Gender, violence and human security 
 
The concept [of human security] was a boon for feminist scholars in particular: it gave them 
a language to interject concerns about the kinds of interpersonal and structural violence 
women experience into larger debates on security. (Heideman 2013: 217).  
…[W]omen are often the ones most victimized by violence in times of armed conflict… [Their] 
basic well-being is also severely threatened in daily life by unequal access to resources, 
services and opportunities, not to mention the many forms of violence women experience 
under “ordinary circumstances”. … [T]he concept of human security is able to capture this 
broader range of threats and risks. … It is therefore not surprising that the appearance of the 
concept was celebrated as offering new lenses through which to understand the difficulties 
women and girls encounter… (Rubio-Marin and Estrada-Tanck 2013: 238). 
 
A substantial body of work has applied human security ideas to gender concerns and 
personal security, and at the same time has enriched human security analysis with ideas 
from gender theory (Truong et al. 2006, 2014; see also Wibben 2011). The gender-free 
discussion in most human security work—including by the Commission on Human Security 
(2003) argues Tripp (2013)—uses an overly abstracted notion of humanity: ‘…assumptions 
based upon “identity-less” individuals are inadequate for generating conceptions and 
perceptions of security… [And] when focusing on identity, gender cannot be excluded’ 
(Hoogensen and Stuvoy 2006: 217).  
Rather than shrinking human security concerns into one compartment, the gender-
informed work emphasises how understanding and promoting people’s security requires 
holistic consideration of their lives. Promoting the security of battered women, for example, 
cannot be done in isolation from considering their economic empowerment and access to 
health and other care support services, argues a study from Pennsylvania. 
They say they want work and love [Freud’s summary of basic human needs] that allow them 
to challenge conventional notions of feminine domesticity and dependency without fearing 
punishment from employers, police, welfare bureaucrats, or coercive and controlling men. 
They want to build communities of care that will encourage them to flourish as they 
determine their own life projects and pursue work and love free of want and fear. (Brush 
2013, p.127). 
But, argues Bumiller (2013), current U.S. technologies of governance show no interest in the 
wider systems of opportunity, constraint and discrimination, and have converted the agenda 
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of physical security for women into a project for the control specifically of black men, 
notably through frequent and lengthy incarceration.  
Human security analysis ‘has real configuring power on gender relations’ argues 
Ferree (2013: 291), in part because it can bring consideration of those wider systems. 
Rubio-Marin and Estrada-Tanck show how it complements human rights law, which provides 
criteria for what are important risks and damage but is traditionally highly individualistic in 
focus. Human security analysis shows if and how ‘the violations of rights happen as part of a 
systematic pattern…of structural discrimination and vulnerability’, and looks at the ‘collective 
conditions necessary for the enjoyment of all human rights’ (2013: 253). From examination 
of cases of killings in Turkey and Mexico, and broad campaigns to mobilize and deepen 
human rights law, they argue that a human security perspective helps to guide human rights 
thinking towards states’ positive obligations to protect rights, not only to investigate and 
punish violations. Meaningful reparations for violence and murder consist not merely of an 
amount of cash, but also reforms to help change a discriminatory and dangerous 
environment.  
One theme that emerges from the gender and human security literature, as in other 
branches of human security work, is the central importance of perception and framing. 
‘Personal security’ involves fundamental psychological dimensions. Human security analysis 
then characteristically, if not always, leads to attention to the multiple different perceptions 
of threats and (in)security: by ‘experts’, including from various different disciplinary 
traditions, and by ‘citizenry’, including from various different social milieux, strata, and 
cultural traditions, and from non-citizens too. While in some cases it is adequate to speak of 
expert assessments as ‘objective’ and ‘citizen’ assessments as ‘subjective’, sometimes a 
different vocabulary is needed, for the assessments may draw on different sources of 
information, different criteria for responding to uncertainties, and different values about 
what is important. Sometimes the gaps between objective and subjective versions of 
(human) security threats can reasonably be understood in terms of popular paranoia or 
popular insouciance, but not always. Cases where citizen assessments are misplaced, cases 
where ‘expert’ assessments are misplaced, and cases where nobody reliably knows are all 
widespread. The field for investigation is very rich, as one sees for example in ‘citizen 
security’ studies.  
 
5. ‘Citizen security’ studies  
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The notion of ‘citizen security’ may predate ‘human security’ as a widely used policy motif. It 
emerged as a guiding goal for the reform of the security forces in Spain after the Franco 
regime ended in the late 1970s. Thus the concept emerged not in security studies silos in 
rich countries but in public fora in the ‘semi-periphery’. It subsequently influenced efforts to 
renovate ideas of security in many countries in the Americas which had suffered under 
authoritarianism and the National Security Doctrine of the 1950s to 1980s (Feierstein 2010). 
Similarly in the Philippines, the fall of the Marcos regime in 1986 resulted in a new People’s 
Security doctrine somewhat similar to human security thinking, which is still evolving 
(Gomez 2011).  
The citizen security concept arose initially thus in efforts to disband a bloated state 
repressive apparatus, reinvent the institution of the police, and confront the legacies of 
general distrust of state institutions and rule of law. Later, although the task of disbanding 
was deemed completed, the spectrum of issues in citizen security studies has grown, 
including concerns with gender, youth, privatization of physical security services, and 
immigration. It overlaps with the SSR (Security Sector Reform) agenda noted by Krause 
(2013). Indeed the citizen security approach gives an umbrella that allows a transformation 
of the negative views of ‘security’ that linger given the memories of abuses and repression. 
The concept has been rising in several international organizations (see e.g. the World 
Development Report 2011) and is perhaps becoming a sister ‘boundary object’ that appeals 
to multiple audiences and facilitates communication between them (Star and Griesemer 
1989, Gomez 2011).iv 
Besides its focus on the building and strengthening of institutions such as the police 
and the criminal justice system, the citizen security approach has served to explore in depth 
the objective-subjective dialectic inherent to security: first, crime and violence threats are 
objective in their occurrence but have lasting and probably self-reproducing consequences 
on general perceptions, which in turn affect future behaviour; second, perceptions can vary 
markedly from objectively identified realities, but also sometimes capture phenomena 
missed by ‘expert’ or official studies and monitoring systems. The Costa Rican HDR defined 
citizen security as “the personal, objective and subjective condition of being free from 
violence or from the threat of intentional violence or dispossession by others” (UNDP 2005, 
p. 35). This conception necessitates inclusion of perception surveys to catch the view from 
below. Such surveys now benefit from decades of research on “fear of crime” (Hale 1996) 
and present a higher level of methodological sophistication compared to much other human 
security research. The surveys may, for example, be prepared so as to help in testing causal 
models of the factors behind crime. 
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The data gathered on perceptions and realities is then translated into various forms; 
for example, indexes, such as versions of the Human Development Index (HDI) modified by 
a personal security variable, as done in Costa Rica. Furthermore, questions have been used 
to find the costs that the feeling of insecurity brings in terms of loss of tranquillity, freedoms 
sacrificed and resources allocated.  
The focus on strengthening existing institutions that is characteristic of citizen 
security studies is in danger of maintaining some of the vices of traditional security 
orientations. Despite how important the control of crime is for the legitimacy of the state 
(especially the government), uses of the approach have often tended to overlook other 
security ‘providers’ apart from private physical security services. In some citizen security 
reports the traditional means for security—the police and the penal justice system—seem to 
be more prominent than the threats themselves.  
Interestingly, some research on citizen security warns that “the dilemma of modern 
policing is not necessarily about how to decrease crime rates but about how to reduce the 
feeling of insecurity.” (Ruiz Vásquez et al. 2006, p. 74). The Costa Rican HDR (2005) 
revealed that the perceived frequency of some crimes is as much as eight times the 
(estimated) real occurrence. The recent citizen security report for Latin America shows that 
levels of felt insecurity are similar for all the region despite very different recorded or 
estimated incidences (UNDP 2013). One hopes ‘citizen security’ studies can at least partly 
correct such perceptions and open traditional thinking and doing, amongst both the citizenry 
and the traditional security organizations, to more comprehensive perspectives in human 
security analysis so that misallocations of fear can be better understood and counteracted.  
A danger exists of misusing the adjective ‘citizen’, to discriminate against non-
citizens. Not surprisingly, elsewhere in the literature non-citizens are an important concern 
in human security studies (Edwards and Ferstman 2010). Choice of the adjective ‘citizen’ 
may have matched the mainly urban nature of the phenomena scrutinized in citizen security 
work, while the term’s ambiguity (‘citizen’ can refer to membership of the city or 
membership of the state) may have been supportive of state-building projects in the 
societies adopting this language. Yet, migration and the trans-boundary nature of crime and 
many other human security issues demand attention to non-citizens, and it is not clear if a 
citizen security language is up to that task. Migrants have been traditionally scapegoated for 
crime and other social ills notwithstanding that statistics show such fears are very largely 
unfounded (UNDP 2005, 2012b, Cantarero Escandell 2010).   
 
6. Has work on human security reduced to ‘personal security’?  
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Krause (2013) reviews why personal safety and bodily security are so important, hence why 
this category of human security studies is deservedly prominent and why security sector 
reform has become central in much foreign policy and development aid since 1994. He tries 
though to go further: ‘Many of the problems that would come under the UNDP or Human 
Security Commission understanding of human security have thus fallen by the wayside (for 
example, health or food security)’ (Krause, 2013, p.84). Indeed, much of what goes under 
the label ‘human security’ within the European and North American governments and 
international agencies that he looks at is focused on control of physical violence. We saw 
that amongst the ‘dimensions’ of human security raised by the 1994 Human Development 
Report several fitted in established policy portfolios, while ‘personal security’ matched less 
well. But just as not all work on human development or human rights needs to be under 
ministries or agencies or budget headings with those labels, the same is true with the cross-
cutting concerns of human security. In addition, work on health and food security is 
prominent in human security research and policy in various locales:- in comprehensive 
mapping studies; when tracing the interconnections between conventional ‘sectors’, such as 
in work on the health impacts of wars or of economic policy choices; and, not least, in the 
large volume of work on global environmental change and human security (e.g., Brauch et 
al. 2008; Matthew et al. 2010; Sygna et al. 2013), which traces out the implications of 
environmental change for people’s lives, in and across all portfolios. 
The National and Regional Human Development Reports that have taken human 
security as an explicit theme or framework allow us to consider the operationalisation locally 
of human security themes across many aspects and arenas. A study led by Richard Jolly 
looked at the human security focused reports prepared for (and/or supported by) UNDP in 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Mozambique, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste (Jolly 
and Basu Ray 2006, 2007). Jolly observed that Human Development Reports conceived in 
terms of human security have been: 
 typically in one or other of three broad settings: 
● by countries which have just emerged from conflict; 
● by countries facing elements of national (and in some cases, regional) insecurity as a result 
of military activity; and 
● by countries in the midst of fundamental socio-political and economic transition. (Jolly 
2013, p. 140). 
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These three origins might generate three different typical report types, though Jolly and 
Basu Ray did not explicitly address that question. In contrast, a follow-up study by Gomez et 
al. (2013) considered whether there are distinctive types. This study reviewed around 
twenty Human Development Reports, including a few still in process of completion and one 
that was never approved for publication by the national government (Pakistan). The new 
study was able to access literature in Spanish, which helped to reveal additional interesting 
work such as a very ambitious but not widely known report from Chile (1998); and observed 
that a number of common design options have emerged.  
Two common emphases found in these Human Development Reports are, first, 
comprehensive mapping (an attempt to look at all the major types of threat to human 
security in the given time and place), and second, personal security, with special reference 
to crimes against person (bodily security) and property. This second type of HDR could thus 
be called citizen security reporting, and some reports used that name. So one can see both 
narrowly and broadly framed work on human security, and can speculate that securities with 
already established organizational homes and names appear less likely to be treated under a 
new name such as human or personal security.  
Also seen several times in this set of HDRs are, third, studies that focus on what is 
considered a central (potential) provider/actor/problem: the state. These studies are very 
relevant to ‘personal security’ but not relevant to, or concerned with, it alone. For example, 
the report on Afghanistan (2004) identified the huge efforts necessary to address multiple 
threats in order to make state-building feasible; and the Palestine (2009) report found that 
most threats felt by the population relate to indignity and to the impossibility under 
occupation of having an adequate state provider. Both reports show the insufficiency of a 
narrow violence- or crime-centred agenda. 
Fourth, there are several studies that identify and focus on one or sometimes more 
other distinctive challenges that are felt or experienced as priorities in the particular 
setting—for example, food security, as examined in the 2012 Africa regional report. In fact 
all the stronger HDRs that have adopted a human security approach include a focus on 
working out what are locally relevant priority issues, even if they do a (relatively) 
comprehensive mapping or a ‘citizen security’ study or centre on state-building.  
Based on their comparative review, Jolly and Basu Ray provided advice for future 
studies. Many studies have adopted most or much of it, including in various citizen security 
reports.  We select some of the points. First, do not analyse only in terms of the seven areas 
of possible insecurity suggested in the 1994 HDR; focus in terms of the distinctive 
challenges encountered in each specific case. While some subsequent reports have found 
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the checklist of seven areas still a helpful handrail, we saw that many others have gone 
beyond it. They do what Taylor Owen, for example, has called for: move away from a 
universal set of criteria to instead use locally relevant and locally determined criteria, and to 
get down from national to local level. By shifting scales from the national to the local, 
human security becomes a manageable concept, reducing from hundreds of possible threats 
down to a handful of priority challenges (Owen 2013, pp. 310-311). One can identify danger 
‘hotspots’, localities which are marked by several intense human security threats, and 
which—given also threat interlinkages—should be high priorities for support. As he notes: 
‘hotspots are an effective means of presenting large amounts of information to the public 
and to the policy-making community. This process is replicable in any region or country’ 
(Owen 2013, p.317). Similar analysis is now done in some national HDRs (e.g., Benin 2012). 
Indeed it was done already in the 1994 global HDR, which sketched ‘a partial set of 
indicators [which] even though it captures only a few dimensions, if several of the indicators 
point in the same direction, the country [concerned] may be heading for trouble’ (UNDP 
1994, p.38). Annex 1 of the 1994 Report applied this method to presciently identify and 
warn of a set of countries in (then) silent crisis. 
Second, Jolly and Basu Ray stressed measurement, to provide sharp focus, build 
respectability, find unforeseen phenomena and reveal unseen patterns. Many recent HDRs 
perform well in this respect, and some are outstanding, for example the reports from Costa 
Rica, Philippines, the Caribbean and Benin, all of which prominently include citizen security 
concerns. Third, building on measurement, Jolly and Basu Ray called for comparing the 
security benefits of various sorts from alternative possible expenditures, to examine cost-
effectiveness and trade-offs. This is more politically daring and, while Mahbub ul Haq had 
the boldness to do so (Gasper 2011), not many HDRs have openly followed suit. An 
exception is the 2012 Africa report, which compares expenditures in defence with those in 
agriculture and suggests a typically much better cost-benefit balance from investing in 
nutrition rather than arms and armies (UNDP 2012, pp. 53, 90). National reports have found 
that this kind of approach is often not easy because of political sensitivities. Also at country 
level the actual usage of budgets requires careful interpretation—e.g., much of a defence 
budget might be for pensions for early-retired soldiers benefitting from peace and longer life 
expectancy. Still, reports on citizen security have usefully suggested ways to assess the 
impacts of threats and security measures: for instance, the 2013 Latin America regional HDR 
shows how persons restrict their leisure activities because of fear of crime, and the 2005 
Costa Rica report asked about money spent on personal protection and the time lost in 
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protective measures. Data-rich reports allow other analysts to extend these sorts of 
comparisons later.  
The comprehensive mapping approach in human security reporting responds to the 
challenge of presenting full pictures of security as envisioned in the 1994 HDR. The HDRs, 
with their substantial financial, institutional and intellectual support, have offered a good 
opportunity to test what originally seemed to some observers too large to be meaningful. 
‘Personal security’ figures in these comprehensive reports, but not considered in isolation. 
The reports in this category illustrate diverse options. The reports for the Arab Countries and 
Benin stayed conservatively with the 1994 typology of aspects, while the Thailand and 
Latvia reports innovated. Following the conservative approach facilitates comparison across 
countries and regions, since each such study uses the same categories. The comparisons 
are often revealing, such as that for the Arab Countries (UNDP 2009a) crime is not a major 
reason for concern while for the Central America report (UNDP 2009c) it was considered 
almost by definition the most important component of human security. Having a fixed list 
also helps identification of biases in perception of threats (Slovic 1987). Even if perception 
surveys do not show nutrition as a major source of concern, for instance in the Arab 
Countries, the list makes sure that nutrition issues are examined; and the objective 
indicators reveal that nutrition there should indeed be cause for concern.  
The Benin report produced a Human Security Index via a simple aggregation of the 
subjective proxies used for each of the seven 1994 security categories. This allowed 
comparison of the public perception of threats with ‘objective’ measurements and with the 
HDI, for each region in Benin. The effort provided a synthesis of the information captured 
by the institutions in charge of statistics, and confronted it with what the fears held by the 
population suggested the government should also know. Some of the subjective measures 
became incorporated by the national statistical system, thanks to collaboration with the 
relevant offices, who will now produce the human security index regularly. The Benin 
example illustrates a way of institutionalising human security analysis and of thereby 
grounding the types of discussion that it aims to foster.  
The approaches in the Thailand and Latvia reports moved beyond the old 
classification of securities. In the former, a fast audit over the basic sources of concern 
contained in the 1994 list led into an effort to identify, through views from both experts and 
lay persons, prospective problems of the future. Doing so supports the prevention-better-
than-cure orientation in human security thinking and helps to generate discussion of the 
roles the various social actors will be required to play in countering the challenges foreseen.  
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The Latvia report team created and applied the idea of securitability, i.e. capability to 
avoid insecurity or restore security. They identified configurations of actors that are or can 
be catalytic for promoting human security, and analyzed how such catalytic effects took 
place. They studied also: the psychology of feelings of insecurity; issues related to the most 
proximate network of support, the family; and the links to the social contract with the larger 
community. This report’s approach shows relevant possibilities for when merely 
consolidation of existing institutions is no longer a sufficient option for addressing 
challenges.  
A comprehensive mapping approach has its problems. Besides the demands in 
resources and the methodological difficulties, it is not usually conducive to preparation of 
detailed policies. A multi-threat human security report cannot provide thoroughly researched 
solutions for all the issues that it investigates. For that, it is necessary to proceed to focused 
efforts, such as seen in the citizen security reports, but now on the basis of having chosen 
these priority challenges and foci through the fresh comparative overview. This is the ideal 
dynamic in a human way to conceive of security; threats will never be absent and the 
soundness of security conceptions depends on their ability to identify new issues sufficiently 
in time, periodically relocate efforts in order to ease both objective harm and subjective 
fears, and start over again without essentializing anything except, perhaps, the humans that 
a human security approach places at its centre.  
 
7. Conclusions - Why the concept of human security is elastic and has neither 
shrunk to personal security nor stayed in seven boxes 
 
This paper has overviewed some aspects of the evolution of human security thinking and 
doing during the last twenty years, with main attention to the ‘lens’ of work on personal 
security. Ideas have multiple potentials which emerge over long periods, not all at once, and 
a relevant comparison that we mentioned earlier is with the unfolding of human security 
thinking’s partner, human rights discourse, which has manifestly evolved over decades and 
generations in numerous spaces and directions. In principle, the personal security ‘lens’ was 
an artefact to focus on a particular set of threatened values, but in practice it has largely 
been used to look at some particular types of threat. Examining literature that uses this lens 
to look at physical violence and crime, sometimes with special reference to gender, some 
potentials of the approach were seen. Human security approaches to these personal security 
threats have challenged established narratives of security, both through the focus on 
individuals and by opening the way for more complex pictures of the person, not only the 
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physical but also the emotional person. An emphasis on the psychological and the subjective 
makes the role of ‘framing’ and the human biases in risk perception crucial in further work 
and a source of insights that can facilitate the opening of security thinking. Human security 
research and practice can contribute to dispelling unnecessary anxieties and showing 
opportunities for flourishing beyond irrational fears.  
The ‘lens’ of ‘personal security’ is nonetheless an artefact, and so any of the various 
personal security approaches should still lead authors to connect their analysis to the 
broader human security picture. A human security approach is seen to involve a combination 
of direct attention to specific issues and to broad mappings of diverse causal factors and 
threats, factors which in their interaction determine the (non-)fulfilment and vulnerability of 
basic needs, rights and values of various types of people in their particular and diverse 
circumstances. This approach, with its attention to the intersection of diverse factors in the 
lives of specific persons and types of people in specific contexts, can add distinctive and 
novel insights (Tadjbakhsh 2013). 
The fundamental interconnections between different threats and also between 
different values make it problematic to divide security into sharply distinct categories: 
‘personal’ versus ‘economic’ versus ‘health’ and so on. Adequately engaging with real 
human-environmental (‘socio-ecological’) systems requires using less fixed pre-set divisions, 
and benefits from the human security concept’s elasticity, as evidenced in the reports that 
we have discussed. Using a “human security perspective [helps us] to analyse in an 
integrated manner the collective threats that facilitate human rights violations of individual 
persons and [to] highlight the interrelatedness between conditions that would otherwise be 
analysed in an isolated manner” (Estrada-Tanck 2013, p.168). A ‘wide-angle lens’ human 
security perspective (leading into ‘zoom lens’ in-depth work on identified priority areas and 
groups) facilitates the necessary ‘boundary work’ (Star and Griesemer 1989, Gomez 2011) 
that spans between conventionally separated intellectual and political spheres. In the 
process, a human security approach may promote two essential qualities: the perception of 
an intensively interconnected global system which we share; and the ability to think 
sensitively about how other people live their lives (Gasper 2013). It can thereby favour 
changes of perspective that are needed in how people perceive shared interests and shared 
humanity (Gasper 2009, Mine and Gomez 2013; cf. Beck 2009).  
This emphasis on the expanding circle of the human security idea must not be 
understood as a dismissal of research and practice in relation to organized violence. 
Personal physical security is fundamentally important. But declarations that only intentional 
violence, organised violence (MacFarlane and Khong 2006), and/or violence in public spaces 
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should be the focus in all ‘human security’ analysis are highly questionable. Such steps lose 
much or most of the value-added from a human security perspective, which looks at the 
threats to how people live and can live and which adds value through person-centred 
attention to the intersections of multiple dimensions of life. Domestic violence, unorganised 
crime, physical damage from environmental events or from accidents, and many other 
matters are all often greater threats than intentional/organised/public/political violence.  
We should distinguish between a fixed, reduced characterization—such as that 
‘human security’ should be treated only as ‘personal security’ or only as physical security 
against organised intentional violence—and a situational focusing of attention according to 
circumstances in a particular time and place. Prescriptive attempts to fix security agendas 
have typically been frustrated in due course by the unpredictability and interlinkages of 
threats. A human security agenda calls not for a permanent scanning and analysis of 
everything, nor for a permanent fixed focus on one pre-set part of life, but an alternation 
between periodic wide scanning followed by intensive focus on the insecurities identified as 
most pressing in the particular time and location. This agenda makes us think about how 
priorities are decided, which are the relevant providers and means, and how do we decide 
which trade-offs are tolerable and which not. The interaction and alternation between 
narrower focus studies such as citizen security-type reports and on the other hand 
comprehensive mappings suggests how the agenda of human security analysis is to help 
prioritise within the broad realms of human development and human rights, in a context-
sensitive way. Human security analysis needs thus to work within a broad intellectual 
perspective, if the vices of in-silo securitization are to be kept at bay. 
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i Switzerland has a Human Security Division (Peace, Human Rights, Humanitarian Policy, Migration) in its 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thailand has a Ministry of Social Development and Human Security. 
ii See e.g. the review in Tarnogórski (2013). 
iii Further, Article 3 in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights states that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person", whereas the HDR 
1994 category of ‘personal security’ includes the right to life rather than lying outside it. 
iv The 2011 World Development Report tried to introduce its own concept of citizen security, meaning only 
freedom from physical violence and the fear thereof. The Report’s attempted exclusion of other types of 
freedom, violence and fear, notably crimes against property, and (in practice) even domestic violence, deviates 
from the usage now established from the Hispanophone literature. 
